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The U.S.-Saudi partnership has been foundational to America’s Middle Eastern 
policy for decades. Security, stability, and oil flows have enabled a positive, productive 
working relationship despite incredible cultural differences. However, a confluence of 
issues are promising to bring big changes. The rise of Iran, the Shi’a/Sunni split, and the 
expansion of American fracking is creating a gulf between the two states. The recent 
death of King Abdullah, who tenuously balanced the U.S. partnership with Saudi 
interests, has opened the door to King Salman and his young son Prince Mohammed to 
take Saudi Arabia in a new direction. This paper seeks to analyze their actions, and their 
plans, and what that might mean for U.S. interests in the Middle East.  
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Introduction 
The U.S.-Saudi partnership was the foundation of much U.S. Middle Eastern 
policy for decades. Beginning with the discovery of oil in the 1930s, the U.S. and the 
house of Saud have depended on each other for mutual economic and security concerns. 
As oil rose in global strategic importance, so did the security cooperation between the 
two countries. The expectation of stable oil flows from the world’s largest oil producer 
led to a concurrent expectation that the United States would provide the means for the 
monarchy to stay in power. The U.S. could depend on the Saudi monarchs to support 
overall U.S. geopolitical interests, at times over the wishes of their own civilians, and 
kick in as a “swing producer” when global oil supplies became tight. These fundamental 
tenets ran from the founder—Ibn Saud—to the most recent monarch—King Abdullah.  
However, his death in early 2015 marked a turning point for the current King 
Salman, and his upstart son Prince Mohammed, to take their country in a new direction. 
The rising sectarian split in the region, the increasing capability of the Saudi state, and 
the American emergence as an energy producing powerhouse were ongoing at the time 
of the monarchial change. The former King Abdullah maintained a close relationship to 
the United States, and preserved the decades-long partnership through the beginning of 
these trends. The new monarchy, however, promises to fundamentally alter the 
partnership with the United States, and the country’s status as an oil-dependent 
economy.  
This allows Saudi Arabia to pursue a policy that breaks with their traditional 
U.S. dependence, enabling them to fully and independently pursue their own economic 
and security interests. This means that the U.S. will lose a complaint security partner 
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and the traditional “swing producer” of oil that they depended on to manipulate the oil 
market at their urging. While this will free up the U.S. to pursue a geopolitical 
rebalancing to the rising East Asian region, it will also result in a diminished American 
capacity to directly influence events in the Middle East, as multipolarity replaces 
decades-long U.S. hegemony.  
In order to demonstrate this, this paper will first examine the history of the U.S.-
Saudi partnership between King Ibn Saud and King Abdullah. This will show the 
history of the mutual dependence between the two states, but also the ability of the 
United States to encourage the Saud monarchs to adopt policies that were in the U.S. 
interest. The Arab spring, which erupted at the end of King Abdullah’s rule, will 
demonstrate the antecedents for the Saudi desire to move away from the United States 
and more directly influence the region. 
 Then, the recent monarchy change will be examined, and will introduce the rise 
of King Salman’s young son, Prince Mohmmad, who heralds a fundamental shift to the 
“new generation” of princes poised to alter Saudi policies. Prince Mohammed’s “Vision 
2030”, which will simultaneously move the Saudi economy beyond oil, and deal with 
significant demographic challenges. This will set up the primary mechanism that will 
allow the Saudis to establish economic, and therefore security, independence from the 
United States.  
Concurrent to that will be an explanation of the changing American security 
trends, which have simultaneously demonized Saudi Arabia, and increased the 
American interests in East Asia. Mostly symbolic, but nonetheless representative 
actions like the 9/11 JASATA bill and the U.S. “pivot to Asia”, gives further impetuous 
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that the alliance is changing, and that the Saudis will likely expect an expiration of their 
privilege in American policy planning. A discussion of flashpoints around the region—
Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Israel—will further demonstrate the increasing desire for 
Saudi Arabia to directly influence the region around them and pursue independent 
policy, even if it runs contrary to current U.S. efforts.  
Finally, the paper will argue that the introduction of Saudi Arabia and the U.S. 
as more market-focused oil producers will diminish the value of OPEC, putting a nail in 
the coffin of Saudi Arabia as a reliable oil manipulator for U.S. interests. This will 
facilitate a drawdown of U.S. assets in the region, as they move beyond direct 
influencers of policy there, to narrower goals like commercial trade and nuclear non-
proliferation.  
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King Salman and Prince Abdullah 
Line of Succession 
On January 23rd, 2015,  after a three-week fight with pneumonia, King Abdullah 
passed away1 His defacto twenty year rule of Saudi Arabia represented the longest 
stretch of power for any monarch in the country’s history, surpassing even his father, 
Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, the founder of the modern Saudi state. While his rule was marked 
by massive regional transformations, King Abdullah’s policy responses were one of 
caution and realpolitik, as he mostly chose to play defense by building up his military 
might through U.S. arms purchases. His death, particularly at a moment of U.S.-Iran 
rapprochement, ISIS expansion, and Houthi rebel victories in neighboring Yemen, left 
the new King Salman bin Abdulaziz at a crossroads. 
In order to smooth the transition to power as quickly as possible, Saudi Arabia’s 
Allegiance Council announced their full support for the new king and reordered the line 
of succession.2 They named the last remaining son of founder Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, 
Prince Muqrin, as crown prince. King Salman’s nephew, Bin Nayef, interior minister 
and a top counter terror and military official, became deputy crown prince.3 
However, at eighty years old, King Salman recognized the dire importance of 
immediately stamping his influence in the line of succession. Within two months of 
taking over, he altered the line to promote Bin Nayef to crown prince over Muqrin. 
Most notably, he bestowed the Deputy Crown Prince title to his son, Prince 
                                                      
1 Al Jazeera. "King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia Dies at 90."   22 Jan. 2015.  
2 Wehrey, Frederic. "Saudi Arabia’s Anxious Autocrats." Journal of Democracy 26.2 (2015): 71-85.   
3 Ibid 
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Mohammed, who was only 29 years old. This shakeup solidified the potential for King 
Salman to influence Saudi Arabian politics long after what will more than likely be a 
relatively short reign.  
Since becoming deputy crown prince, Prince Mohammed has had a dramatic 
role in his father’s new government. He is now the defense minister, the country’s chief 
economic planner, the head of the state oil company Aramco, the head of the Saudi 
sovereign wealth fund, and the head of the government accountability office.4 Western 
educated and forward thinking, Prince Mohammed is taking over an incredible amount 
of Saudi state power and is immediately having a massive im  Because of this there is 
intense speculation that Prince Mohammed will be the next leader of Saudi Arabia. 
Becoming crown prince—leapfrogging his uncle in the process—would only be up to 
the discretion of King Salman, and is not without precedent. In 1999, King Hussein of 
Jordan promoted his son Abdullah to the crown prince at the expense of his brother, 
Prince Hassan, from his deathbed, guaranteeing his son’s ascent to the throne.5   
Prince Mohammed’s wide portfolio and bold plans are likely tests for him to see 
if he is a viable leader for the future. Receiving such heavy responsibility, and at such a 
young age, are likely the only way that King Salman can effectively set up his son’s 
ascent to the throne. In King Abdullah of Jordan’s case, he had numerous shortcomings 
(like needing to learn more Arabic after years of English living), but his respect among 
the Jordanian military as a special forces commander, and an aggressive propaganda 
                                                      
4 Kirkpatrick, David D. "Surprising Saudi Rises as a Prince among Princes." The New York Times. 6 June 
2015.    
5 Shlaim, Avi. Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2008.  
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campaign to portray him as the natural heir to Jordan’s previous kings secured his 
position as the leader of the country.6 Without similar military experience, Prince 
Mohammed needs to engender worldwide and domestic respect quickly in order to be a 
potential successor.  
Logically, the Kingdom has an incentive for transitions of power to happen 
quickly and undramatically. It’s good for investment, for international confidence, and 
for internal stability. More so than democratic countries, where power rests in 
institutions as well as individuals, the appearance and acceptance of power in a 
monarchy is the foundation of that monarch’s control and effectiveness. Although the 
transition between King Abdullah and King Salman went smoothly, history 
demonstrates the potential for trouble, in addition to added pressures occurring because 
of long term trends. 
The vast majority of Saudi princes won’t make direct claims to the throne. They 
are too far removed from the direct bloodline to be perceived as legitimate, and do not 
have enough clout to have widespread support. However, they do have influence over 
its successor. Prince Mohammed is undoubtedly performing to win over the respect of 
the international community and the Saudi public, but he is also attempting to prove 
himself to the many Saudi princes to demonstrate that he is fit to be King too. 
Therefore, the next few years are incredibly important to the development of Prince 
Mohammed’s claim to the throne. His numerous responsibilities are a functional 
                                                      
6 Shlaim, Avi. Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2008.  
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audition to the complicated web of royal influence that has sway over the innerworkings 
of the state.  
The elites of Saudi Arabia, particularly of the new generation, recognize that 
their positions of privilege stem from having competent leadership that can strike a 
balance between maintaining their considerable power and support from their subjects. 
The old social compact of trading in political freedoms for economic growth are not 
sustainable in a more globalized world where oil is no longer funding the state like it 
used to. The current inefficiencies of the state are inadequate to provide for the growing 
population, and elites are increasingly realizing that changes are necessary. The old 
systems of patronage, which favor elder statesmen due to their experience and respect, 
is becoming outdated. While there will be holdovers, there is a growing consensus to 
support an agenda that diversifies the economy and enables opportunities for the 
broader population.  
Prince Mohammed has several benefits that fit in line with the intentions for 
long term survival of the Saudi elite. His youth makes him representative of the 
country’s young population. He appears more connected with their needs, and more 
responsive to their vision for the future. The youth of Saudi Arabia can see themselves 
in Prince Mohammed, and have appreciated his actions. His media presence and 
growing popularity will enable him to positively spin some symbolic reforms as 
substantial, giving time to soothe the an anxious public and smooth over problems with 
the old guard. They still want to maintain their favorable lucrative positions within the 
state, and incorporating them into a vision for the future while simultaneously placating 
the populace will be a critical balancing act for Prince Mohammed. 
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Political reforms thus far have been largely cosmetic, and represent an instance 
of this balancing act. As the economy reforms and the state relies more on domestic 
taxes, there will be tension between maintaining the power of Saudi elites and 
expanding representation to match increased public funding of the government. Taking 
away political power, and perhaps replacing it with favorable benefits from the waves 
of privatization, offers a way to please both sides and open up space for citizens to have 
a greater say in their state and elites to still maintain their position of privilege. 
Diversification provides more opportunities for stakeholders to take advantage of 
privatized businesses, as economic power can be decentralized from the state into the 
elites of the private sector.  
Complicating things is the United States, which is one of the chief backers of 
Nayef due to his extensive record of counterterror cooperation with the U.S. As interior 
minister, he had an extensive part in developing a counterterror strategy that focused not 
only on locking suspects up, but countering their ideology through vigorous counseling 
and re-education.7 U.S. military commanders have adopted similar strategies in their 
counterterror efforts.8 As such, the intelligence and defense communities both prefer 
him to the upstart Prince Salman, seeing his experience and alignment with U.S. 
geostrategic interests as preferable to the relatively unknown neophyte Salman. 
However, increasing tensions between the Saudi and U.S. governments seemingly 
lower the long-term benefits of a pro-U.S. official, reducing the odds of Nayef staying 
in his position as crown prince.  
                                                      
7 Ansary, Abdullah F. "Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach." Middle 
East Policy 15.2 (2008): 111-42.   
8 Ibid 
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If Prince Salman can build respect within the Saudi royal court, faith among the 
sizeable youth population of the country, and positive thoughts from world leaders, his 
ascent to the throne will be made clear, and Saudi policy will revolve around him for 
the next few decades. Barring some sort of internal upheaval, or internal pressure to 
democratize like the British monarchy, King Mohammed will be the most influential 
actor in Saudi Arabia during the 21st century. Certainly, given his father’s trust in 
assigning his son rapid control of the many critical aspects of the country, the throne is 
Mohammed’s to lose. If, however, he takes on too much too fast, and flies too close to 
the sun, his stock will come crashing down, leaving the door for stalwart Bin Nayef to 
takeover and largely continue current Saudi policies. While Bin Nayef is part of the 
younger generation of princes, his history as interior minister and focus on security will 
engender him to a more cautious advancement of Saudi policy.  
Demographics 
Looming over all Saudi leaders is the country’s young and rapidly maturing 
population. A staggering 70% of Saudi Arabia is under 30 years old, and a confluence 
of factors will increase their expectations for jobs and opportunity.9 Many grew up 
during the 2000s boom years, ingraining a mindset of growth expectations. Many grew 
up with their parents in government jobs, with benefits and high job security.10 The rise 
of the Gulf states, and lifestyles in places like Dubai and Doha, are centers culture and 
fun for young Saudis. Many have traveled, and see aspects of other countries that they 
                                                      
9 Hubbard, Ben. "Young Saudis See Cushy Jobs Vanish Along With Nation's Oil Wealth." The New York 
Times.   16 Feb. 2016.    
10 Ibid 
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want to mirror, in terms of both personal and economic freedom. Many have received 
state based funding to attend colleges abroad, and have expectations for quality jobs that 
put their expertise to good use. Absent large scale reforms to the economy, Saudi 
Arabia will not be able to grow fast enough to provide good jobs for its youth, putting 
pressure on the government with influential discontent.  
Polls among Saudi youth indicate their strong desire for greater independence 
and opportunity.11 Many want to utilize their passions for careers that will provide a life 
for their families and their communities. Young women increasingly expect access into 
the workforce among a wide variety of fields, including those that have been 
traditionally male focused.12 Fascinated by technology and travel, the burgeoning youth 
population is setting high standards for the government to provide opportunity for their 
ambitions.  
The young population also wants an increased emphasis on social change, with 
many finding current restrictions to be behind the times. Growing up with the internet, 
social media, and international travel has opened many up to a lifestyle incongruent 
with the current theocratic order.13 In a symbolic step towards reducing the power of the 
mosque in state functions, the perception of upcoming change gave the state the space 
to bring about an end to the formal powers of the religious police,.14  
                                                      
11 Murphy, Caryle. "Saudi Arabia's Youth and the Kingdom's Future." Woodrow Wilson Center for 
International Scholars (2011): n. pag.    
12 Mittlestaedt, Juliane Von, and Samiha Shafy. "How Working Women Are Remaking Saudi Arabia." 
Der Spiegal.   23 June 2013.    
13 McDowall, Angus. "Saudi Reform Plan Flirts with Social Change." Rueters, 26 Apr. 2016.    
14 "Saudi Arabia Strips Religious Police of Arresting Power." Al Jazeera, 13 Apr. 2016.    
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Vision 2030 
Prince Mohammed and a growing contingent of Saudis recognize that the state 
cannot sustain the oil-based economy of the last seventy years. Oil revenue currently 
accounts for almost 90% of the state budget, leaving the fiscal health of the country 
vulnerable to price swings.15 While this dependence was often beneficial for elites 
because they could buy public support through low taxes and generous subsidies, it left 
Saudi Arabia woefully ill-prepared to face the challenges of both increased fossil fuel 
extraction (like fracking) and decreased oil use (through climate change policies). Boom 
times created free-spending policies, which were difficult to reverse in bust times once 
people became accustomed to them.16   
 The state’s remedy to these concerns is Prince Mohammed’s Vision 2030, an 
economic plan to fundamentally change the way that the Saudi economy is structured. 
He hopes to diversify the country’s economy beyond its dependence on oil by 
promoting growth in the private sector both through government incentives and the 
selling of government assets. With a nod to neoliberal economic ideas, he believes that 
the sale of state assets will make those services more dynamic and efficient, while 
reducing the need for those services to be dependent on oil revenue.17 These assets will 
not be completely open to an international market, with foreign investors are capped at 
10% ownership of companies.18 While U.S. investors would wish for no cap at all, the 
                                                      
15 "Saudi Arabia Economy Profile 2016." Index Mundi, 8 Oct. 2016.    
16 Jehl, Douglas. "Where Oil Is Plentiful but Cash Is Short." The New York Times.   16 Jan. 1999.    
17 Reed, Matthew. "Saudi Vision 2030: Winners and Losers." Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2 Aug. 2016.    
18 Sharif, Arif, and Matthew Martin. "Saudi Arabia to Let Foreign Investors Participate in IPOs." 
Bloomberg Markets, 18 Aug. 2016.    
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opening up of the country to investment nonetheless represents a tantalizing business 
opportunity, especially in context with the rapidly coming-of-age population. Instead, 
wealthy Saudi business leaders will be well positioned to take advantage of the sale of 
state assets, with connected business people benefiting from waves of privatization.  
The biggest state asset of all, the Saudi oil company Aramco, is even on the 
table. In what will be considered the largest IPO in history, the Saudi government will 
put up 5% of the Saudi oil company on the market.19 This amount may rise in the future 
depending on the success of the initial sale, but not enough to jeopardize overall Saudi 
control over the company. This oil giant is estimated to produce one out of every eight 
barrels of oil in the world.20 It functionally represents the lifeblood of the old Saudi 
state; a model Prince Mohammed wants to move away from. Its sale could bring 
incredible amounts of money in to finance Prince Mohammed’s agenda.  
Beyond partial sales of Aramco, Prince Mohammed wants the company to 
evolve into a “global industrial conglomerate”. The company traditionally has been one 
of the largest producers of oil in the world, exporting massive amounts of unrefined 
crude to refineries all over the world. Now, there is a large effort to diversify its 
function into one that also refines the oil it produces, allowing the company to produce 
a variety of advanced products that require lighter, more developed oil stocks.21 This 
also allows it to better access evolving world markets that have a greater demand for 
more refined oil products. Other than its regional Middle East market, very few world 
                                                      
19 "Sale of the Century?" Economist 9 Jan. 2016 .  
20 Petroff, Alanna. "7 Crazy Numbers about the World's Biggest Oil Company." CNN Money, 11 May 
2016.    
21 Krane, Jim. "A Refined Approach: Saudi Arabia Moves beyond Crude." Energy Policy 82 (2015): 99-
104.    
 
 
13 
 
regions seek the heavy crude oil Saudi Arabia traditionally produces, leaving much of 
their current exports to be refined anyway.22  
The kingdom is also seeking a variety of measures to promote efficiency and 
diversity in the oil sector to reduce waste and reduce the need to either import or 
produce refined oil. These goals fall in line with a recent strategy to invest in the 
alternative energy capabilities, which would reduce the kingdom’s dependency on 
subsidized cheap fossil fuels.23 The cutting of gasoline subsidies in the spring of 2016, 
which will simultaneously increase domestic revenues and decrease domestic gasoline 
consumption, is a necessary reform to allow the kingdom to free up oil resources for 
other uses that fit in line with vision 2030. The public response to this was mixed, with 
government supporters lauding the reform, critics airing their frustrations on social 
media, and nervous citizens queuing for hours to get the last subsidized gasoline before 
the price hikes.24  
Expanding beyond oil, the kingdom is hoping to triple exports in non-oil 
sectors.25 This will offer opportunities for Saudis to diversify their economic activity 
and move beyond dependence on oil exports as the primary source of foreign revenue. 
This fits in line with his ambitious desire to make Saudi Arabia a major producer of 
military arms and equipment. Currently, Saudi Arabia depends significantly on 
countries like the United States to sell them advanced weapons to equip their military. 
                                                      
22 Ibid 
23 Bahgat, Gawdat. "The Changing Saudi Energy Outlook: Strategic Implications." The Middle East 
Journal 67.4 (2013): 565-79.    
24 Amos, Deb. "Higher Gas Prices, Long Lines: What Cheap Oil Means For Saudi Arabia." NPR, 31 Dec. 
2015.  
25 "Full Text of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030." Saudi Gazette. Al Arabiya, 26 Apr. 2016.    
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Under Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia would produce half of its military needs domestically, 
drastically spurring internal industrial production and reducing Saudi Arabian 
dependence of foreign arms.26 This will likely change the Saudi relationship with the 
U.S. from one that is based on military investment, to one based on economic 
investment, as current arms sales represent the lion’s share of trade ties between the two 
states. With rising discontent regarding arms sales to Saudi Arabia in the U.S. senate 
(represented by 27 senators from both sides of the isle voting against the most recent 
agreement) this would better secure Saudi equipment for the future.27  
The income from this massive influx of cash will be used to create the world’s 
largest sovereign wealth fund that will fund the state’s activities through investments.28 
For instance, the state has already made a $3.5 billion investment into Uber.29 This fund 
will likely increase Saudi investments in the United States, building on already 
substantial investments made by the Kingdom. The Saudis are estimated to have over 
$750 billion in both private and public assets in the states, and this represents important 
business for both businesses and investment banks.30 With many of investment bank 
boards made up of former government officials and other influential people in U.S. 
policy, the Vision 2030 will likely be viewed favorably in government circles and 
                                                      
26 Fattah, Zainab, Vivian Neriem, Deema Almashaabi, and Dana Khraiche. "What’s In Saudi Arabia’s 
Blueprint for Life After Oil?" Bloomberg, 25 Apr. 2016.    
27 Carney, Jordain. "Senate Rejects Push to Block Saudi Arms Sale." The Hill, 21 Sept. 2016.    
28 Reed, Matthew. "Saudi Vision 2030: Winners and Losers." Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2 Aug. 2016.   
29 Isaac, Mike, and Michael J. De La Merced. "Uber Turns to Saudi Arabia for $3.5 Billion Cash 
Infusion." The New York Times.   1 June 2016.    
30 DiChristopher, Tom. "Saudis Threaten $750B Asset Sale, but Experts Question It." CNBC, 20 Apr. 
2016.    
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translate into increased Saudi economic influence.31 This offers one of the best hopes 
for keeping positive U.S.-Saudi relations in the long term, because although politicians 
can currently score points with the public in critiquing the Saudis, they are more 
accountable in a post-Citizens United world to their donors and their powerful allies 
that gain from the continuing Saudi investment. With unlimited amounts of election 
spending allowed by Citizen’s United, Congress people are required to raise gargantuan 
funds to match likely opponent spending. This raises the overall influence of wealthy 
individuals, including current and future investors in Saudi Arabia.  
The government’s efforts to send Saudis to the United States will naturally set 
up increased opportunities for the investment fund to find its way to U.S. businesses. In 
2012, over 60,000 Saudi students attended universities in the U.S.32 The most popular 
major among Saudi students is business, which creates a climate where they understand 
U.S. business dealings best. Their understanding of English also opens doors to dealings 
with businesspeople, and their connections with classmates and other future business 
leaders during their studies will open avenues not available in other countries. A 
significant portion of investment activity occurs due to networking, meaning that Saudi 
students, past, present, and future, will create a pipeline that better enables them to 
make continued investments in the United States.   
Reliance on this fund and the subsequent drawdown in oil dependence will have 
several ramifications on broader U.S. interests. The first is that Saudi Arabia’s 
                                                      
31 Ollivant, Douglas. "Why We Should Keep an Eye on Saudi Arabia." New American Weekly 30 Sept. 
2016 .  
32 Khorsheed, Mohammad S. "Saudi Arabia: From Oil Kingdom to Knowledge-Based Economy." Middle 
East Policy 22.3 (2015): 147-57.   
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decreasing reliance on oil will make it less apt to manipulate the oil market. This lowers 
their role as the “swing producer” of oil supplies that is a cornerstone to their 
relationship to the U.S.33 While they will still export oil, the Saudis will be less 
responsive to U.S. desires to increase or decrease oil production as in the past. This will 
decrease the strategic position that Saudi Arabia has enjoyed, bringing them on par with 
other oil producing states that the U.S. has amicable, but less special, relationships with.  
The introduction of a two trillion-dollar financial fund will also stimulate 
investments, allowing for more wealth management in the Gulf, and an expansion of 
trade.34 While trade between the two countries is not particularly diverse, it still 
represents a substantial amount of money. Bilateral trade between the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia was over $71 billion dollars in 2013, with U.S. exports to the kingdom valued at 
$20 billion.35 As the Saudi population ages, and the economy gets more diversified, 
these imports from the U.S. will likely grow, creating deeper commercial ties between 
the two countries. Already, this model pioneered by other Gulf states has fit firmly in 
U.S. interests, with high-end U.S. exports thriving among the wealthy Gulf populace.36 
Like the UAE, the tremendous wealth of the Saudi citizenry offers a lucrative and 
desirable market for U.S. producers.37  
                                                      
33 Krane, Jim. "A Refined Approach: Saudi Arabia Moves beyond Crude." Energy Policy 82 (2015): 99-
104.   
34 Fattah, Zainab, Vivian Neriem, Deema Almashaabi, and Dana Khraiche. "What’s In Saudi Arabia’s 
Blueprint for Life After Oil?" Bloomberg, 25 Apr. 2016.   
35 Mason, Robert. "Back to Realism for an Enduring U.S.-Saudi Relationship." Middle East Policy 21.4 
(2014): 32-44.    
36 Hanieh, Adam. "Khaleeji-Capital: Class-Formation and Regional Integration in the Middle-East Gulf." 
Historical Materialism 18 (2010): 35-76.    
37 Aarts, Paul, and Joris Van Duijne. "Saudi Arabia after U.S.-Iranian Détente: Left in the Lurch?" Middle 
East Policy 16.3 (2009): 64-78.    
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Amongst the desire to transform state funding, the Saudis intend to build on the 
biggest draw for non—Saudis into the kingdom, the Hajj. Eight million Muslims visit 
the kingdom each year and pay homage in the two holiest cities in the Islamic faith.38 
Vision 2030 intends to expand the kingdom’s capabilities to absorb 30 million visitors a 
year, which would bring in an incredible amount of income and prestige to the Saudi 
state.39 As Saudi Arabia’s influence continues to expand among the Muslim world, U.S. 
policy makers will see the value in partnering with the kingdom in greater connection 
with the worlds growing 1.5 billion Muslim population.40  
The drastic expansion of foreigners into the state will require a massive 
investment in transportation infrastructure, which goes hand in hand with their long 
term development strategy.41 The Prince wishes to leverage Saudi Arabia’s geostrategic 
location as a crossroads between Europe, Asia, and Africa as a selling point for 
investments and logistics.42 Bordered by the Red Sea to the West, where much of the 
world’s trade passes through due to the Suez Canal, and the Arabian gulf to the East, 
through which much of the world’s oil trade passes, Saudi Arabia offers a natural transit 
point for economic opportunity.  
The combination of geography and infrastructure spending will be used to lure 
greater foreign direct investment. The Prince wishes to almost double foreign direct 
investment into the country to 6% of GDP, and while ownership of Saudi companies 
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will be capped, this influx of funds will provide Saudis business leaders with the capital 
to expand their operations.43 Some of the foreign investment will likely come from the 
United States, if investors see lucrative opportunities, which will contribute to a climate 
of increased economic cooperation. The expansion of infrastructure will better facilitate 
a globalized market into the country, benefiting U.S. companies. 
The important location of the Saudi state, coupled with their economic 
prominence in the Arab world, will mean that they will remain important to larger 
American interests in the Middle East.44 Even if there are rifts, American policymakers 
looking at the economic picture of the Middle East will argue that cooperative relations 
are necessary to meaningfully influence politics there. If Vision 2030 is as successful as 
the King and Prince intend it to be, the economic and political clout of the Kingdom 
will only continue to grow.  
To absorb the large number of Saudi citizens that are coming of age, Prince 
Mohammed is targeting strict labor market controls to ensure that many of the jobs go 
to Saudi workers. The current dependence on foreign labor, while lowering labor costs, 
theoretically undercuts Saudi development because much of the earnings of foreign 
workers go home through remittances rather than staying inside of the Saudi economy. 
Prince Mohammed wants more of the indigenous Saudi workforce to provide the 
backbone of the working class, but may run into problems with a workforce that largely 
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believes itself to be above such menial tasks.45 Furthermore, the reliance on oil as a 
major export led to a type of Dutch-disease, making it difficult for manufacturing to 
grow. Dutch-disease is a concept developed after the Netherlands found significant 
natural gas reserves.46 Their sudden increase in resource exports lead to a strong 
currency, which in turn made their manufacturing more expensive and non-
competitive.47 Goods in Saudi Arabia cost more to produce than goods in other 
countries with weaker currencies, meaning that even if Saudi Arabia had a workforce 
eager to engage in blue-collar work, the goods they produced would have little export 
potential.  
This structural shortcoming leads the state to pursue a knowledge based 
economy where ideas and innovations will be exported, instead of goods. This mirrors 
other advanced economies who are similarly uncompetitive with their manufacturing 
sectors. It is no mistake that many goods produced in the United States now 
acknowledge that they were designed domestically but produced externally. The Saudi 
government is using their capital to invest in fields like science and technology, aiming 
to increase overall expenditures from .2 percent of GDP in 2000 to over ten times that 
figure, 2.5 percent of GDP by 2020.48 Laying the foundations of a knowledge based 
economy are a key pillar to the overall success of Vision 2030, because that offers the 
best way to ensure that Saudis have the capacity to innovate and create jobs to absorb its 
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youth bulge. This also best takes advantage of a youth population that is more tech-
savvy and educated than the country has seen before.  
The shift from Saudi Arabia as a swing producer of oil, ready to manipulate the 
market at U.S. urging, to a diversified economy, alters the primary economic force 
binding partnership between the two countries. While the state will remain important 
due to its raw oil production and geopolitical location, it will not be as pliable to 
American desires, and will be able to act more in its own economic self-interest. This 
will result in a decreased American desire to expend resources on its protection, along 
with a concurrent drop in advanced weapons deals. The dramatic expansion of Saudi 
domestic weapons protection is a hedge against this, and enabling the state to act more 
independently on security issues as well. While the commercial bonds will strengthen 
due to an increased opportunity for diversified trade and investments, the top-level 
bonds will weaken, transforming Saudi Arabia from the foundation of American Middle 
East policy to a lesser role of occasional partner when interests align. While losing their 
biggest backer puts the modern Saudi state into uncharted waters, the fissures in U.S.-
Saudi relations due to the Arab spring and negative American domestic opinions, the 
expansion of domestic U.S. natural gas production, and the growing American interest 
in East Asia, encourage Prince Mohammed to pursue policies that would create a 
stronger, independent, and more capable Saudi Arabia.  
Reform Headwinds 
Looming against the plan to modernize the country’s economy is the 
conservative core and other vested interests. Balancing modernization efforts with 
potential discontent is a fine line that Prince Mohammed must walk. After more than 
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seventy years of controlling Saudi policy, the established order will not acquiesce 
lightly to perceived or real loss of power. Old economic forces will likely demand their 
stake in the new economy, in similar fashion to the crony capitalists that benefited from 
neoliberal reforms in other Arab countries like Egypt.49 While this keeps power stable, 
it stunts economic growth by undercutting efficiency and lowering competition. This 
prevents more dynamic domestic investors from taking part in economic plans that 
would be more productive for Saudi growth. It also shuts out foreign investors from the 
United States who would like to capitalize on the situation too. 
The staunch religious base has been painfully accommodated as the country’s 
economy advanced into the 21st century, but economic demands and a younger, more 
progressive populace will require concessions that the religious elite are not accustomed 
to making. The investment in Uber highlights the paradox of Saudi Arabia investing in 
a car driving app with women in their ranks as drivers in western countries while Saudi 
women themselves still cannot get behind the wheel. How the old order deals with the 
critical integration of women in the workforce will be a major hurdle to ensuring that 
the Saudi economy moves beyond its oil reliance. Integration into the global economy 
will put increased pressure to cater to more diverse lifestyles, because companies and 
foreign professionals will be reluctant to move to Saudi Arabia, and talent will be more 
reluctant to stay, if they do not think that there are adequate social freedoms to ensure a 
desirable quality of life.   
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In addition to numerous social pressures, the shift from an oil-based economy to 
a reliance on a sovereign wealth fund poses unique economic challenges. The 
downsides of the investments will mirror that of similar funds. When wealthy fund 
managers take advantage of loose capital controls, they can place their assets into 
locations and withdraw them quickly if deemed advantageous.50 These investor flights 
can devastate countries. They also place pressure on corporations to be beholden to the 
wishes of their financial backers, placing their obligations potentially at odds with local 
citizens. The expansion of foreign direct investment, necessary to generate capital 
investment, will be vulnerable to these issues. Political or economic shifts will leave 
companies that receive foreign investment potentially vulnerable.  
Investments are also vulnerable to sudden and drastic market shocks, as 2008 
aptly demonstrates. Banking and congressional leaders argued that the world was 
dangerously, perhaps hours, away from a complete meltdown of the financial sector 
before the banks were saved by the Troubled Asset Relief Fund (TARP).51 Even 
diversified assets were hard hit, demonstrating the precarious nature of depending on 
modern finance. Despite TARP, trillions in assets were wiped away for a few years, 
devastating highly invested states like Iceland and the UAE. Iceland’s instability 
resulted in the resignation of its government,52 while Dubai required a short-term 
bailout from Abu Dhabi to meet its fiscal obligations.53 Retirement and savings 
accounts can survive fluctuations in the market, but states, which need stable money on 
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a yearly basis, are ill-equipped to rely on such funds. This leaves Saudi Arabia as a 
potentially unreliable ally in the event of an unforeseen future global financial crisis. 
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Background 
U.S.-Saudi Partnership from King Ibn Saud to King Abdullah 
Strategic partnerships often stem from economic or security benefits. For almost 
70 years, Saudi Arabia fit both, and was the Arab centerpiece in America’s Middle East 
strategy.54 Before and during the Cold War, America leaned on Saudi Arabia via close 
collaboration and at times outright pressure for U.S. military operations, oil market 
stability, and anti-communist doctrine. Recent counter-terrorism cooperation has added 
yet another dimension to the partnership, in line with broader U.S. goals of economic 
and political stability in this vital region. Normally, a free-religion republic and a tightly 
controlled theocracy would have little in common, but the discovery of oil in the 1930s 
necessitated foreign expertise to extract wealth for the burgeoning Saudi state. 
American prospectors were initially called in due to their formidable oil extraction 
history, and their perception as focused on business rather than colonial enterprise.  The 
U.S. ability to tap oil and enrich early Saudi monarchs became instrumental in allowing 
Ibn Saud to maintain control over the newly unified kingdom, creating a mutually 
beneficial relationship for both parties.55   
This relationship allowed for a steady flow of oil throughout World War II, 
fueling allied efforts to beat back axis powers. The Saudi monarchy also allowed for 
allied warplanes to use their airspace, important for the North African theater. After the 
war, cheap Saudi oil helped fuel the recovery efforts of Europe and Japan as part of the 
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Marshall plan, a key U.S. anti-communist policy.56 While the Saudis protested the post-
war partition of Palestine, they offered little more than token resistance, as their need 
for American oil drilling surpassed any desire to move beyond symbolic 
disagreements.57  
Saudi Arabia took advantage of the Eisenhower doctrine, proclaiming 
themselves as ardent enemies of communism.58 Communism was naturally at odds with 
the theocratic government, with Marxists holding firm on their idea that “religion was 
the opiate of the masses”. Saudi Arabia’s anti-communist stance allowed it to receive 
greater military support from the United States, and it was additionally motivated by 
concerns over “pan-Arab” ideology stemming from Soviet partners in Egypt and 
Syria.59 The monarchy, interested in maintaining its hold over the Arabian Peninsula 
and the Muslim holy sites in Mecca and Medina, viewed pan-Arabism as a potential 
existential threat. 
America’s relationship to Saudi Arabia evolved significantly following the 
Iranian revolution of 1979. After years of American influence in Iran, hardliners spurred 
widespread demonstrations to topple the U.S. backed Shah. The rise of a Shi’a 
theocratic regime in the Ayatollah, and the fall of American influence there, created the 
antecedents for the modern Saudi-Iranian rivalry today. In addition to their Sunni-Shi’a 
split, difference over America’s influence in the region only deepened divisions and 
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highlighted the contrasting visions of the two states. Saudi Arabia wished to maintain 
positive military and trade relations with the West, while Iran wanted a sweeping 
revolution across the region that would free states from their supposed subservience.  
Saudi Arabia was a notable backer of Iraq against Iran during the 8-year long 
Iran-Iraq war, launched by Saddam Hussein shortly after the Iranian revolution. Fearing 
the Iranian desire to “export the revolution” to other Middle Eastern states, the Saudis 
shielded themselves from Iran through their support of Iraq’s aggression.60 The United 
States, which provided its own material support to Iraq through the shipment of 
weapons and intelligence information, was happy to see Saudi Arabia assist a fellow 
Arab ally against a vociferous anti-U.S. critic. The Saudis lauded his war efforts against 
the Iranians, indirectly creating the conditions in which he believed such states were in 
debt to him due to Iraqi sacrifices during the war.61  
U.S.-Saudi relations integrated even further due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
in 1991. Alarmed by Saddam’s occupation of a neighboring oil rich state, King Fahd 
turned toward the U.S. for protection, welcoming a massive U.S.-led coalition. After 
Saddam refused to withdraw, American forces began a massive bombing campaign that 
decimated Iraqi civil society. This was followed by a military push into Kuwait that 
liberated the country in under 100 hours. The presence of U.S. troops to kill fellow Iraqi 
Muslims, coupled with a permanent U.S. airbase to enforce a no-fly zone over that 
country, was a major rallying cry for disgruntled Saudi Jihadists returning from 
Afghanistan who then went on to form the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. While Saudi 
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Arabia had dealt with extremist elements in its country since the 1980s, Al-Qaeda 
represented the biggest and most fervent challenge yet.62  
1995 saw an abrupt transition in Saudi power. King Fahd suffered a stroke, 
bringing crown prince Abdullah as acting regent.63 King Abdullah chose to build upon 
his predecessor’s efforts and advance Saudi Arabia through pragmatic policy reforms.64 
Rather than backtrack away from the U.S., as many hardliners in his country were 
urging him to do, he stayed close. This fueled frustrations against the ruling class that 
manifested in support for Al-Qaeda attacks in Yemen and Kenya. Six years after taking 
over as acting regent, Al-Qaeda operations abruptly expanded into the western 
hemisphere, with fifteen Saudi nationals taking part in 9/11.   
Despite the potential for the 9/11 terrorist attacks to derail the alliance, it instead 
grew stronger when Saudi Arabia portrayed itself immediately as an ally in the “war on 
terror”, increasing arms purchases and intelligence cooperation with the U.S. From 
2010 to 2013 alone, Saudi Arabia purchased over $86 billion in arms supplies from the 
U.S.65 Compounding direct weapons sales, it is estimated that the U.S. expends up to 
$50 billion dollars a year to help keep Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies secure.66Close 
military cooperation flourished between the U.S. intelligence community and their 
Saudi counterparts, notably interior minister and top Saudi counter terror official 
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Mohammed Bin Nayef. Facing pressure from the United States over private funding of 
terrorism, the Saudis enacted reforms that shut down a variety of questionable charities 
and other suspected financial sources of terrorist activities.67 The Saudi government 
also assisted the CIA in its program of extraordinary rendition, both through the holding 
of prisoners and the funding of black sites that allowed for the mistreatment of 
suspected militants without fears of legal repercussions.68  
The Saudi monarchy viewed the 2003 Iraq war with trepidation, and were wary 
about the destabilizing effect that the invasion would have on the region. However, they 
were nonetheless ready to commit resources to shape the outcome of the conflict. 
Seeing Iran influence post-war Iraq through their Shi’a proxy groups, the Saudis felt 
that they could not sit by and watch as their regional rival consolidated a “Shi’a 
crescent” from Beirut to Tehran. Saudi efforts to influence the war could be seen in the 
rise of covert financing of Sunni groups in the country.69 These groups, bolstered with 
both private Saudi money and Saudi national fighters, attempted to undercut the 
plurality that propelled Shi’a leaders to power, helping create sectarian tensions that 
would eventually explode into an all-out civil war by 2006.70 This strategy underscored 
a growing aggressiveness in King Abdullah’s later years, with Saudi ambassador to the 
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United States Turki al Faisal bin Abdulaziz, noting that “Saudi Arabia will oppose any 
and all of Iran’s influence and meddling in other countries”.71  
This extended into Yemen, which was the target of Saudi security efforts to 
break up Shi’a organization. Painting Houthi militias as an Iranian proxy group, the 
Saudi military led brief incursions into the Shi’a populated north. 72 However, the 
Saudis only conducted military operations for three months, with limited objectives and 
a politically contentious casualty toll handicapping the Saudi desire for sustained action. 
Rather than risk his military falling into a quagmire, King Abdullah sought to degrade 
Houthi capabilities and settle for what appeared achievable.  
 In addition to perceived Shi’a threats on their border, Saudi internal security 
forces began a concerted repressive campaign against Shi’as in the oil rich eastern 
province, often portraying them as Iranian agents or sympathizers.73 The Shi’a 
population demonstrated for political and religious freedom, but the Saudi state is loath 
to accommodate their demands. Tensions between state-sponsored Wahhabi doctrine 
and Shi’a freedom leaves the region in tension, exacerbated by the tremendous oil 
wealth flowing out of its ground. These moves received scant condemnation from the 
United States, who was busier dealing with post-war Iraq and the Iranian nuclear 
program than holding its regional allies to high human rights standards.  
Furthermore, the United States depended on Saudi Arabia to expand oil 
production when global oil markets suffered shocks. This notably happened throughout 
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the Iran-Iraq war, both Arabian gulf wars, and the Libyan intervention of 2011.74 Saudi 
Arabia’s willingness to overproduce at American urging adds a significant layer to the 
American-Saudi partnership. By ensuring that oil prices would not erratically spike, it 
brought much desired stability to economic markets, a key U.S. goal.  
Although Saudi Arabia could have reaped geopolitical benefits with other 
members of OPEC, along with a healthy boost in revenue by maintaining higher oil 
prices, they routinely overproduced at America’s behest to bring prices back down. This 
substantial action, coupled with years of cooperating with American security efforts in 
the region despite the internal and external blowback, created a long-lasting relationship 
that put Saudi Arabia at the forefront of U.S. Middle East policy planning.  
Arab Spring 
The Saudi response to the Arab spring protests of 2011 highlight their real-
politic line of thinking, and fomented a split between U.S. and Saudi policies. Seeing 
various states buckle under the weight of popular protest, Saudi Arabia engaged in 
targeted interventions when it felt that such interventions would maintain an order that 
was advantageous for them. This contrasted with the Obama administration, which 
initially welcomed the protests and the call for greater political rights throughout the 
region. While the U.S. viewed the movements as an opportunity for a new beginning, 
Saudi Arabia’s monarchs frantically worked to maintain the status quo, lest they too be 
swept up in the turmoil. 
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After seeing the majority Shi’a population of Bahrain rise up and demand 
greater representation from the Sunni monarchy, the Saudis organized a multi-thousand 
troop GCC deployment to assist the Bahraini security forces maintain state control.75 
Rather than risk the neighboring island fall into Iran’s orbit, the Saudi military sent a 
powerful signal that the protests will be put down with force. This also sent a 
secondary, but no less subtle, message to the Eastern province.76 As the Shi’as of the 
Eastern province began to adopt language advocating solidarity and struggle with their 
counterparts in Bahrain, the Saudi government felt that it could not allow the revolution 
in Bahrain to succeed.77 In doing so, they reinforced the idea that airing domestic 
political grievances through popular protest would be met with little tolerance.  
After Hosni Mubarak of Egypt stepped down due to overwhelming popular 
protest, Saudi Arabia viewed the revolutionary efforts with great skepticism. 
Compounding their concerns was the perceived abandonment of Mubarak by the United 
States, who after a thirty-year security partnership, received no support to maintain his 
power. Recognizing that the resurgent Muslim Brotherhood was the most organized and 
politically capable faction in Egypt, the Saudis feared the impacts of the group 
sweeping into, and maintaining, power. The Saudi-sponsored form of Islam is more 
conservative, but takes a more personal, rather than political, approach. The Muslim 
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Brotherhood thrives off political action, and was therefore at odds with the Saudi 
state.78  
Fearing that their ideology of promoting a more active and challenging religious 
class would spread, and alarmed that the United States had accepted an Islamist 
government on their border, Saudi Arabia promoted the “deep state” apparatus of 
Egypt. The “deep state” represents the ingrained, autocratic nature of the military and 
other Egyptian institutions that could not be changed by a simple shift at the top. While 
Mubarak is the figurehead, thousands of members of the Egyptian political elite that had 
benefitted from decades of favorable treatment remained poised to redirect the country 
back to their desired path. Saudi Arabia allied itself with this class, and deprived the 
Brotherhood-led government of aid. This ensured that the Egyptian military was well 
positioned to use the ongoing economic crisis as a pretext to engage in a counter 
revolution when the time was right.79  
After a year of divisive mismanagement by the Muslim Brotherhood, the deep 
state reemerged to force Mohammed Morsi out. In his place, the military championed 
general Fatah al-Sisi as a force for stability. U.S. hesitance to welcome the counter-coup 
robbed the effort of some of its legitimacy. To overcome this, and help cement the 
military’s return to power, the Saudis promised tens of billions of dollars in aid to 
Egypt.80 This was critical in helping the new Egyptian government re-establish control. 
As economic turmoil rocked the country due to continued neoliberal adjustments and 
                                                      
78 Wehrey, Frederic. "Saudi Arabia’s Anxious Autocrats." Journal of Democracy 26.2 (2015): 71-85.   
79 Ibid 
80 Norland, Rod. "Saudi Arabia Promises to Aid Egypt's Regime." The New York Times.   19 Aug. 2013.   
 
 
33 
 
the precipitous drop in tourism, the aid masked some of the problems, allowing the 
Egyptian government to clamp down in repressive fashion.  
In Syria, Saudi Arabia initially took a backseat to Qatar’s more active efforts to 
help the rebels overthrow Bashar Al-Assad. After two years of prolonged struggle there, 
the decline of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and a leadership change, Qatar ramped 
down its efforts to influence the Syrian civil war in 2013.81 This opened the opportunity 
for Saudi Arabia to become the region’s largest sponsor of Syrian rebels. This support 
was a response to Iran’s doubling down on protecting Assad, sending in elite Iranian 
special forces and its proxy group Hezbollah to help the Syrian dictator take back cities 
that had slipped out of his control.82 By 2013, Syria had effectively become a proxy 
battleground between competing Saudi and Iranian influence. 
The Syrian conflict also opened rifts between Saudi Arabia and the United 
States, with the Saudis dismayed by perceived U.S. inaction.83 The U.S. policy of 
pursuing diplomacy over active military engagement has frustrated the Saudis, who see 
it as a tacit deferral to more aggressive Russian and Iranian influence. President 
Obama’s backtrack away from strikes on Assad in 2013, promised initially due to 
Syria’s crossing of the administration’s chemical weapons “redline”, was the pinnacle 
of American policy waffling. With President Obama opting instead for removing 
Assad’s chemical weapons with the help of the Russians, Saudi Arabia expressed 
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consternation at another example of the United States not being willing to back up its 
word.84 These frustrations, directed at the international community as well as the United 
States, culminated in the Saudi’s unprecedented rejection of a U.N. security council seat 
after receiving one in 2014. Citing the inability of the U.N. to intervene in the Syrian 
war, the Saudis deferred, allowing Jordan to take up the seat instead. 
In Libya, the Saudis initially supported a no-fly zone to prevent then dictator 
Muammar al Ghaddafi from indiscriminately bombing his own civilians.85 However, 
they watched in frustration as the objectives expanded from a no-fly zone to a mission 
for regime change. Ghaddafi’s eventual coalition-aided death left a massive security 
vacuum to be filled by varying militias. Libya, which like Egypt had a history of 
repressed Islamist activity, succumbed to those groups’ takeover of various coastal 
cities. Fearing the expansion of such groups, which included the Muslim Brotherhood, 
in an important oil-producing state, the Saudis, along with the United States, gave 
monetary and material support to rogue Libyan general Khalifa Haftar.86 In contrast to 
the divided internationally backed government, eastern Libya based General Haftar was 
more effective in fighting various Islamic factions than any other actor in in Libya’s 
civil war. While he did not bring full stability to the country, he did accomplish Saudi 
realist goals of weakening Islamist groups. Militants were largely pushed out of major 
eastern cities like Benghazi, and ISIS, which creeped up as well, never consolidated 
territory like they did in the western part of the state. 
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Internally, Saudi Arabia did all that it could to take advantage of relatively high 
oil prices to buy off its population. The Saudis spent over $100 billion in their efforts to 
placate any desire for their citizens to call for democratization.87 When Shi’a citizens of 
the Eastern province demanded increased rights and the release of political prisoners in 
the largest protests in modern Saudi Arabian history, the state moved in and harshly 
repressed them.88 Amnesty International documented this campaign and its use of 
arbitrary detention, employment retribution, and coercion.89 Utilizing sectarian tensions 
to their benefits, the Saudis frightened Sunnis around the country who thought of 
joining in the protests by painting their movement as a “fifth column” to destabilize 
Saudi Arabia at the behest of Iran.90 Under the guise of antiterrorism, draconian policies 
allowed the state to arrest clerics and bloggers alike that criticized the monarchy, 
simultaneously removing voices of dissent and sending an ominous message to those 
that would think of adding their voices.  
The aggressive actions that Saudi Arabia took to alter the course of the Arab 
spring was markedly different than the almost laissez faire attitude that the Obama 
administration took to the regional turmoil. Saudi efforts were wide-reaching, touching 
almost every hotspot after the surprise abdication of Tunisian dictator Ben-Ali. Saudi 
Arabia’s rulers had a clear vision—to preserve the power of friendly states, weaken the 
standing of unfriendly ones, and maintain control themselves— to hold and advance 
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their geopolitical standing once the dust settled. The United States, however, lurched 
uncertainly between a hands-off, wait and see mentality, and outright intervention. 
Their abandonment of Hosni Mubarak, their inability to effectively manage post-
Gaddafi Libya, and their backdown from challenging Assad over the chemical weapons 
redline created questions about the U.S.’ commitment to the Middle East order they and 
Saudi Arabia created for decades. The welcoming of change through popular protest 
created uncertainty as to what America would do if Saudi Arabia found itself in a 
similar position. The discrepancy in how each state handled the Arab spring created 
prominent fractures between the United States and Saudi Arabia, setting the stage for 
further policy divisions and a new direction.  
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Geopolitical Rifts 
The Obama Doctrine 
Speaking to the Atlantic magazine in the spring of 2016, President Obama 
informally argued for a “no freeloaders” doctrine.91 This idea calls for American allies 
to shoulder more of the security burdens around the world by being proactive in both 
their own defense and in multilateral operations. This was demonstrated in the way in 
which the U.S. operated with NATO during the 2013 no-fly zone over Libya. Rather 
than have the U.S. do the bulk of the military operations, Obama sought to spread as 
much of the mission out to the U.S.’ NATO allies as possible to minimize the amount of 
military engagement American forces and taxpayers would have to commit to.92 This 
emphasis on ceding American implementation of the mission to a more multilateral 
approach stands in sharp contrast to the previous efforts like the first Gulf war, where 
Schwarzkopf and Bush were reluctant to give up American leadership and control for 
fear putting American lives in the hands of allied military units.93  
While ceding control is something the U.S. military is not accustomed to doing, 
it at times offers the best chance for a successful military operation in the region. As 
King Abdullah of Jordan noted on 60 minutes, groups like ISIS will not be stopped by 
U.S. commandos patrolling Syrian towns.94 The military solution to these conflicts will 
necessitate Arab armies responding to Arab threats, requiring U.S. allies to step up and 
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deal with the problems in their regions. U.S. military forces, which by and large lack the 
necessary language and cultural training to be effective, often cause more problems than 
they solve and offer effective propaganda for state and non-state actors. Arab allies, 
which still must operate carefully to avoid accusations of being Western puppets, still 
offer more upside in their operations than the tried and failed Western interventions. 
A further demonstration of this is functionally happening right now with Saudi 
Arabia. The Obama administration officially wants both the end of Bashar al-Assad and 
the withdrawal of Houthi rebels back to Yemen’s north, but is extremely hesitant to 
commit substantial American hard power to achieve these ends. Saudi anxiety over 
American disengagement is creating strains in the alliance, resulting in a more active 
and independent application of Saudi hard power around the region.   
President Obama’s administration lived by the motto, “don’t do stupid stuff”, 
which created a high bar for him to approve any major U.S. foreign policy actions 
involving force.95 Decades of watching U.S. hard power applied in ways that resulted in 
drastic unintended consequences left Obama wary of the rosy and optimistic picture that 
his advisors or pundits put forth when advocating U.S. intervention during crises, 
especially in the Middle East. His major foreign policy intervention, Libya, was taken 
only after intense pressure from Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice, and Samantha Power, who 
all advocated that the possibility that Benghazi would turn into a massacre due to 
Muammar Gaddafi’s chilling comments about going house to house and cleansing the 
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city. This forced Obama to confront the possibility of a genocide, ultimately causing 
him to approve the mission after feeling the ghosts of Rwanda in the situation room.96  
However, the aftermath of Libya only seemed to redouble the President’s 
caution toward big foreign policy maneuvers, as mission creep set in and the country 
spiraled out of control following Gaddafi’s death. The expansion of the NATO mission 
beyond protecting Benghazi, into a full-blown effort to enact regime change, 
highlighted the difficulty in controlling the consequences of a military mission once it 
starts.97 The instability that followed, with the country splintering into rival militia 
groups, demonstrated the inability to effectively control the unintended consequences 
that arise after the military objectives are “met”. This led to Obama’s willingness to 
listen to Dennis McDonough’s skepticism about striking Assad in 2013, and his general 
policy of disengaging from force as an option for American influence towards a heavier 
reliance on diplomacy.98  
Saudi Arabia and the United States will diverge in estimates of necessary 
intervention. As the U.S. continues to roll down its application of hard power and direct 
interference, the Saudis will redouble their efforts to pursue a foreign policy that 
protects allied Sunni states and contains Iran and its allies. At times, their interests will 
still align, providing for an appropriate instance of the Obama doctrine. At other times, 
Saudi policy will be counterproductive to regional stability, and at worst, will foster the 
type of blowback that the U.S. would try to avoid. The Saudi war in Yemen, and the 
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intervention to fund rebels and overthrow Assad, will lead to unpredictable blowback. 
However, the call for other states’ autonomy over issues in their neighborhoods will 
always have results that the U.S. finds unpalatable, given that this is the very nature of 
ceding direct control over a situation. Due to the litany of bad things that could directly 
result from the U.S. clumsily trying to apply their power to a crisis, this still offers a 
potentially more effective opportunity for the U.S. to encourage solutions while 
simultaneously maintaining a non-interventionalist policy.   
 Pivot to Asia 
The Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” represents a shift away from the 
Euro-Middle East focus that has been a constant aspect of American foreign policy 
since the end of World War II and the first Gulf War, respectively.99 The pivot is 
multifaceted, with both military and economic implications. American military assets 
will be gradually transferred toward the Pacific region, to bolster their forward presence 
in the region and establish deeper military connections with allies. Part of this has 
already begun, with U.S. troops redeployed to Australia and Singapore.100 Some of 
these troops will come from the Middle East, lessening American presence in the 
region. For Saudi Arabia, this represents a worrying decrease in American military 
backing. Saudi Arabian leaders have long counted on the presence of American troops 
and naval fleets within the region to quickly respond to potential existential threats. 
They count on the American military to offer a strong rebuke to Iranian influence, 
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because the prospect of immediate American military retaliation represents a strong 
counter to potential Iranian aggression.   
The Obama administration, and likely those that follow, are intent on expanding 
American economic and trade influence in East Asia. Over half the world’s population 
lives in East Asia and the Indian subcontinent, and that region’s rapid development 
offers an incredible opportunity for an expanded partnership with the United States. 
President Obama has taken numerous visits to Asia, and at times has opened new 
avenues with states shut out by old U.S. policy. During the first term of the Obama 
administration, the U.S. signed a free trade deal with South Korea.101 President Obama 
also lifted the decades-old arms embargo against Vietnam,102 and promised to lift 
economic sanctions against Myanmar.103 The lynchpin to his economic strategy is the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a multi-lateral economic trade deal with six signatories 
from the Asia-Pacific region. Pushing hard for TPP through much of his administration, 
the deal is only a few years from ratification and implementation, and promises to 
enrich U.S. economic ties across the Pacific Ocean.   
While trade is not zero-sum, the Saudi government sees efforts to promote trade 
in the Asia-Pacific region as further proof of the U.S. government’s decreasing reliance 
on the Middle East and North Africa. The Obama administration demonstrated very 
little effort to bolster the economy of states in the region, with most of the focus on 
either emergency aid or military weapons sales. These short-term trade relations do 
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little to formulate the long-term reassurance that would assuage the Saudis into 
believing that America is in for the long haul.  Part of this is undoubtedly due to the 
instability that has rocked the region due to the Arab spring, but nevertheless the lack of 
U.S. overtures to improve the economic situation has been disconcerting. 
Compounding the feelings of a Saudi-U.S. split is the souring mood inside the 
United States due to accusations of terror support. A 60 Minutes special detailing 
twenty eight pages of formerly classified speculative material from the congressional 
9/11 report created an internet firestorm with conspiracy theorists arguing that the pages 
would have a “smoking gun” linking the Saudi government directly with the 
hijackers.104 While the information did not reveal anything spectacular, the Saudi 
government temporarily threatened to sell off hundreds of billions of dollars in U.S. 
assets in retaliation, creating unnecessary economic uncertainty.105  
A result of the increased suspicion towards the Saudi government is the push by 
U.S. lawmakers to make it legal for private citizens to sue the Saudi government. 
Private citizens whose family members died in the 9/11 terrorist attacks pushed 
lawmakers, notably Senator Charles Schumer of New York, to allow them to seek legal 
retribution against what they called a “state sponsor of terrorism”.106 The bill passed the 
senate, but was vetoed by President Obama due to concerns that it would both damage 
cooperation with Saudi Arabia on issues of counter terrorism as well as open American 
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citizens to similar forms of legal retribution for actions by the U.S. government.107 
Despite the insistence of the administration and the intelligence community, the U.S. 
senate voted in a historic 97-1 vote to overturn the veto and pass the bill.108  
The Saudi government takes the combination of the pivot to Asia and the 
growing anti-Saudi clamor as a serious sign of the decreasing value of the U.S.-Saudi 
partnership. This will result in less cooperation with American military officials, less 
avenues for American military hardware, and less opportunity to establish special trade 
relationships with the United States. The Saudis recognize that they cannot afford to 
keep their eggs in one basket, and the lessons of the Arab spring have taught them that 
U.S. backing is liable to rapidly disappear if political situations shift. The Saudi 
government is using this as the further impetuous to restructure the economy through 
Vision 2030, making them more independent and capable absent American backing. 
While they will still maintain some security cooperation and commercial ties with the 
United States, they will move beyond the bilateral relationship by relying on themselves 
in addition to developing relationships with rising powers like India and China.  
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Saudi Independence 
Iran 
Saudi foreign policy has long adopted a cold-waresque mentality against their 
regional rival, Iran. The Saudis have challenged Iranian influence throughout the last 
decade, but have markedly increased their efforts in the past year. The efforts by Prince 
Salman in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq underscore tensions and divisions between the two 
states. In a highly symbolic anti-Shi’a gesture, the execution of Saudi-based Shi’a cleric 
Nimr al-Nimr on trumped up charges of inciting violence exacerbated divisions.109  
In May of 2016, the GCC voted to label Shi’a organized Hezbollah as a terrorist 
organization, reversing years of tacit support for the organization due to its attacks on 
Israel. Hezbollah, which engages in acts of terrorism, nonetheless is a powerful, 
influential, and respected group in Lebanon. This move further deepened the political 
crisis in Lebanon, which has been split largely along sectarian lines, paralyzing the 
country’s political process. By discrediting Shi’a politicians there, the Sunni gulf states 
are putting their weight against Iran supported Shi’as in Lebanon, exacerbating another 
Shi’a/Sunni split in the region. 
Prince Mohammed seeks to deepen Saudi influence with overtures to fellow 
Sunni states to expand military cooperation. In June 2015, the Saudis announced a joint 
military force with Egypt, highlighting their support of the military forces that are 
largely in control of the country. In addition to billions in military aid, Saudi Arabia is 
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positioning itself to be one of the largest material supporters of the largest and most 
culturally influential Sunni state in the Middle East.  
In November 2015, the Saudis announced a large multilateral Sunni coalition to 
cooperate on issues of counterterrorism, primarily ISIS. Almost all Sunni states in the 
MENA region are included. However, this coalition notably excludes countries most 
severely affected by ISIS in Shi’a governed Iraq and Syria.110 Although the unification 
of Sunni states against threats like ISIS is a great step to creating the necessary regional 
response, the notable absence of Shi’a states in Syria, Iraq, and Iran compromises the 
effectiveness of the organization and threatens to stoke further sectarian tensions. There 
is a prominent discord between Sunnis and Shi’as on which groups are “terrorists” and 
which are not, threatening to continue the same type of impasse that has sabotaged 
Russian and U.S. cooperation on Syria due to disagreements on terrorist labels.  
Compounding the worry over the Sunni/Shi’a divide in the Middle East, the 
Saudis are deeply concerned about the U.S.’ detente with Iran. The Iranian nuclear deal 
was accepted by the Saudis with extreme reluctance, who would have preferred 
containment and isolation to keep the Iranians down.111 Seeing the U.S. acquiesce to 
Iranian influence in Iraq, and waffle over Iranian overtures in Syria, leaves the Saudis 
anxious over the long-term viability of the U.S.-Saudi alliance. Compounding this is the 
large Iranian-Afghani border, and a similarity of U.S. and Iranian goals there. The 
Iranians detest the Taliban, and are against the expansion of ISIS on their eastern flank. 
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The Saudis recognize that there is space for Iranian-U.S. cooperation in Afghanistan, 
which only adds to their concerns.112 
The United States and Saudi Arabia, even if they disagree about the efficacy of 
the Iran deal, are still partners in non-proliferation in the region. The United States does 
not want to see an expansion of nuclear weapons to any state on the globe, and Saudi 
Arabia does not want to see any more nuclear weapons introduced into the Middle East. 
Although there have been low rumblings of the Saudis making deals with the Pakistanis 
in the event of an Iran nuclear breakout, the Saudis believe that a nuclear arms race 
would be deeply counterproductive and destabilizing to the region.113 In this regard, the 
United States and Saudi Arabia will share a common goal and remain partners on the 
nuclear weapons front, and united against any instance of potential Iranian proliferation. 
The acknowledgement of the United States that Iran has a role to play in the 
region will be a massive wedge between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. As the Saudis assert 
themselves more in the Middle East, it will often be to contain Iran’s influence and 
undercut their allies. This will result in more instability, as smaller Middle Eastern 
states deal with the effects of great power proxy wars. While there will be some 
instances of Saudi efforts that the U.S. welcomes, others will create outcomes that the 
U.S. would rather not see.  
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Yemen 
Prince Mohammed began his tenue as defense minister of Saudi Arabia with a 
major crisis on his border. Shi’a Houthis from North Yemen, armed with weapons from 
Iran, rapidly swept through the country and took the capital Sana’a in the fall of 
2014.114 They resorted to armed struggle to prevent the implementation of a harmful 
restructuring of the country. The Hadi government wished to implement a federal 
reorganization of the country that would split the state into six federal areas, with the 
Houthi areas split up, and the primary Houthi homeland denied critical resources and 
access to the sea.115 Houthis received substantial assistance from Sunni military leaders 
still loyal to ousted longtime president Saleh in their efforts.116 Saleh, who was ousted 
in 2011, still had significant loyalty in the Yemen among those he enriched in his multi-
decade dictatorship, especially as the country’s leader, al-Hadi, was hardly effective at 
uniting the country and bringing it forward.  
Shortly after the death of King Abdullah, the Houthis dissolved the parliament 
in Sana’a and fully committed themselves to the coup.117 Al-Hadi, who was still intent 
on pressing on with the federal implementation, was forced out.118 Hadi’s resignation, 
and then reappearance in Aden where he rescinded his resignation, caused the 
Houthi/Saleh alliance to surround the southern port city. Worried about losing a Saudi-
allied autocrat on his border, Prince Mohammed organized a Sunni Gulf state coalition 
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that engaged in immediate military operations against Houthi targets.119 Combined with 
a naval blockade to stop the Iranian weapons, the coalition airpower gave cover for al-
Hadi forces and tenuously allied southern secessionists to take back much of the 
South.120 However, progress against entrenched Houthi forces in places like Sana’a has 
left the conflict at a standstill. The southerners, who are intent on an independent (or at 
least far more autonomous), state for themselves were not fighting to restore Hadi’s 
power in Sana’a.121 While the intervention saved al-Hadi from the brink of destruction, 
the country is in a functional stalemate, and the Sunni coalition gains came at great cost 
to civilian lives and food security.122  
Yemen is the poorest Arab state, with a rugged geography that makes access to 
various areas tenuous. The coalition’s destruction of Yemen’s infrastructure to quell the 
Houthis is an alarming, and ultimately short-sighted war strategy. While many live in 
cities, access between cities themselves and the interlaying hinterlands has deteriorated 
rapidly. The efforts to hinder the movement of Houthis and Saleh-loyalists, coupled 
with the blockade, has left between half and two-thirds of the country food insecure.123 
Medicine and other critical supplies have been cut off in key areas throughout the state, 
putting many in danger.124 Punishing the whole country for the Houthi insurgency will 
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only alienate the forces that the Saudis hope take back power from Yemen’s general 
population.   
To avoid this, the United States publicly and privately urges the Saudi military 
to avoid striking sensitive targets.125 The U.S has been involved in the coalitions efforts 
since the campaign began, offering logistical and intelligence support.126 As part of this, 
U.S. intelligence passed on a wide list of targets declared unacceptable for targeting due 
to their importance to Yemeni civilians. One of these targets, a bridge connecting the 
capital Sana’a with the coast, was listed as an unacceptable target because 90% of the 
food aid travels over this road.127 In August the Saudis bombed the bridge, partially 
destroying it, and then returned the next day to finish the job.128 The double bombing 
represents either a deeply concerning communications breakdown, or a deliberate 
attempt to deny citizens in Sanaa food aid to put pressure on Houthi rebels entrenched 
there. 
This comes on the heels of a similar incident a few weeks prior, where a 
Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) field office was bombed by coalition forces.129 The 
attack killed 19 MSF staff.  MSF shares the coordinates of its facilities with all warring 
parties, representing again either borderline incompetence or a deliberate targeting of 
NGO infrastructure. Compounding this is three previous attacks on similar MSF 
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facilities. These attacks forced MSF to pull out of Yemen, depriving Yemeni citizens of 
critical medical care, and dealing a blow to the legitimacy of the Saudi intervention.130  
On the heels of these incidents, the U.S. drastically reduced its role in the 
conflict. At its height, the U.S. had forty-five service personnel working with the 
coalition efforts in intelligence, coordination, and occasional refueling.131 Now, the 
Pentagon has reduced that public total to five, signaling a significant U.S. drawdown in 
support. While there are undoubtedly more individuals working in private, this public 
rebuke is telling. Some analysts see this as a way to criticize the method in which Saudi 
Arabia has conducted its operations in Yemen, while officially the U.S. and Saudi 
governments maintain that the drawdown has nothing to do with the growing criticism 
of the war.132  
After eighteen months of sustained bombing and assistance to the al-Hadi army, 
Yemen remains divided along north and south.133 The Saudi commitment to continuing 
military activity for the foreseeable future, as casualties, costs, and instability continue 
to mount, marks a contrasting shift from the actions of King Abdullah and Prince 
Mohammed. The current Saudi monarchy wants to see the restoration of an autocrat that 
will be predictable and pliable to Saudi demands, and appears willing to maintain an 
open-ended commitment to make that happen.134 With peace talks rarely gaining 
traction and no end in sight to the war, Prince Mohammed has committed himself and 
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the Saudi armed forces to a protracted struggle against a divided forces that have 
diverging visions for Yemen’s future.  
This insurgency has resulted in blowback on Saudi territory and U.S. naval 
vessels. Houthi separatists have launched border attacks on Saudi towns near the 
border.135 While these attacks are small in scope, they receive devastating Saudi 
reprisals, and further harden the Saudi resolve to continue their operations in Yemen. 
Houthi fighters have also fired Iranian missiles at both Saudi and U.S. targets. A few 
missiles have been fired into Saudi Arabia itself, but their lack of accuracy keeps them 
from finding their targets in the vast desert Kingdom.136 Multiple missiles have also 
been fired at U.S. naval vessels, who deployed countermeasures and remained 
unscathed.137  
The war also represents a grim, but lucrative market for U.S. arms dealers. This 
includes a $1.15 billion weapons deal in August that includes the sale of M1 Abrahams 
tank equipment.138 American bombs, plane parts, and logistical equipment go into many 
of the Saudi sorties against Houthi and pro-Saleh forces, and this represents a drastic 
expansion away from the low-level U.S. campaign that used CIA drones to target Al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.  
The war in Yemen is the most clear-cut example of the new monarchy’s 
willingness to be bold and aggressive when trying to achieve its geostrategic objectives. 
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Pushing the Houthis back and trying to restore their willing partner al-Hadi has resulted 
in the most wide-ranging and committed Saudi intervention in its modern history. While 
the war at times fits within narrow U.S. interests, the way it is being fought, and the 
potential blowback that could arise from it, demonstrates the benefits and pitfalls of 
Middle Eastern interventions in the age of Prince Mohammed and King Salman.  
Syria 
President Obama was reluctant to arm militant rebel groups in Syria due to 
concerns that such weapons would fall into the hands of more violent factions that also 
wanted to attack U.S. interests and allies.139 Fearing a repeat of 1980s and 90s 
Afghanistan, Obama held back major arms deliveries, giving support to only a few 
targeted programs.140 Instead of large-scale U.S. involvement, Saudi and Gulf states 
have acted as intermediaries by supplying rebel groups. This allows the Obama 
administration to keep their hands “clean” while feeling like something was being 
“done” to achieve the administration’s wish of removing the historically anti-Western 
Bashar al-Assad.141  
Unfortunately, the single-minded Saudi desire to rid Assad, coupled with a 
Wahhabi ideology that often strays too close to religious zealotry, meant that weapons 
ended up in the hands of those the U.S. would deem “too extreme”.142 This creates the 
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conditions where Gulf weapons have mostly indirectly, but sometimes directly, 
bolstered the arsenal of the Islamic State and the Al-Nusra front, posing an ongoing 
security dilemma in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.143  
The war has displaced more than half of Syria’s population. One in five fled the 
country’s border, to be absorbed by Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Europe. The United 
States, worried about the destabilizing consequences that that many refugees can bring, 
has thus far committed almost six billion in aid to help those countries manage.144 The 
United States has encouraged Saudi Arabia to do more to help stabilize the region they 
live in and deal with the consequences of the war that they are helping fuel. While 
Saudi Arabia claims to have provided almost a billion in aid and refuge to 2.5 million 
Syrians,145 international observers like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
are skeptical, instead referring to Saudi efforts as “next to nothing”.146   
These issues are exacerbated by the lack of a viable political solution to the 
conflict. This is due to issues outside of Saudi control, like the introduction of Russian 
forces, the brutality of the Assad regime, and the presence of foreign fighters who 
delegitimize the rebels’ claim to sovereignty. Iran’s direct support and the efforts of 
their proxy Hezbollah only put more pressure on worried Saudi defense hawks to 
double down. But Saudi Arabia has done little to find a genuine solution to the conflict, 
and in the context of U.S.-Russian negotiations, is acting as an unfortunate unilateral 
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spoiler. Through continued support of questionable rebel groups that Assad and Russia 
find unpalatable, Saudi Arabia is acting as an unnecessary roadblock to finding a 
solution to the five-year long conflict.  
The superior force of arms, and relentless commitment of Russian forces to tip 
the balance for Assad has forced the United States to re-evaluate its position in Syria.147 
With few paths for the rebels to succeed militarily, and with the need to deal with a far 
more prominent threat to American security in ISIS, the American diplomatic team has 
slowly and reluctantly acquiesced to the idea that Assad could stay in power in Syria. 
With ISIS representing a major concern in the minds of American voters in the 2016 
election, the political willpower to seek a solution in Syria that takes Assad out of 
power has lost its traction, causing the U.S. delegation led by Secretary of State John 
Kerry to focus on the humanitarian aspects of the conflict rather than the political ones.  
The monarchy is doing all that it can to keep the rebellion alive in Syria. The 
kingdom supported a re-branding and consolidation of Syrian rebel groups into the 
“Army of Conquest” group that currently includes the remnants of the Al-Nusra 
front.148 This move represented the best way to advocate for continued rebel support 
despite dubious Al-Qaeda connections. While the King has occasionally expressed tacit 
approval for various ceasefire agreements, these were likely to allow the rebels time to 
regroup, and were viewed with healthy skepticism.149 The continued Saudi support for 
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rebel groups that include fighters labeled by Russia and Assad as “terrorists” give them 
the internal justification to keep fighting, further damaging peace prospects in Syria.  
Iraq 
Saudi Arabia did not support the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but was quick to do what 
it could to influence the post-war government. Fearing the growing specter of Iranian 
influence in a pluralistic majority Shi’a country, Saudis stoked anti-Sunni anger in Iraq 
during the insurgency and after the U.S. withdrawal.150 While those efforts did not 
directly lead to ISIS, it did help exacerbate the sectarian conditions that led to the 
group’s rise in the Sunni Anbar province.  
ISIS militant advances throughout the country repeatedly exposed the 
dysfunction and poor fighting potential of the American-trained Iraqi standing national 
army. Multiple battalions fled the battlefield, putting up little to no resistance against 
advancing ISIS militants.151 Some soldiers dropped their weapons and took off their 
uniforms, hoping to avoid fighting and escape the group’s brutality. Others wished to 
fight, only to be stuck in neutral as their superiors dawdled during precious hours that 
could have been used to mount a defense. Instead, eager units were often ordered to 
retreat, demonstrating the lack of will by Iraqi commanders to defend Iraqi civilians 
who would be left to fend for themselves at the hands of the advancing group. 
Tragically, some units were surrounded and surrendered, only to be brutally mistreated 
or executed in mass by ISIS forces. The most famous of these occurred in the Camp 
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Speicher military base, where over 1,700 new recruits were executed and piled into a 
mass grave.152  
With the national army crumbling, and ISIS militants in control of Mosul, Iraq’s 
second largest city, and Fallujah, a city less than fifty miles away from Baghdad, Iraqi 
politicians turned to Iran and Iranian supported Shi’a militias to shore up their 
defenses.153 While the United States was wary to see this conflict turned into a sectarian 
one, the facts on the ground necessitated outside assistance, and the U.S. had neither the 
political willpower nor the practical ability to send large scale assistance of its own to 
change the battle in a meaningful fashion. Thus, Iran was welcomed not only by 
Baghdad, but privately by Washington, to prevent the Iraqi state from spiraling down 
into collapse. American military advisors, both on the ground and through airstrikes, 
coordinated and assisted elements of the Shi’a militia forces in a move that undoubtedly 
bolstered Iranian influence over Iraq. 
The Saudi government, however, is concerned with increasing American 
acquiescence to Iranian influence in Iraq.154 Saudi Arabia, whose policies seemed to 
welcome the weakening of the central Shi’a state in Baghdad, looked at the 
developments with great concern. While they would generally prefer stability, the 
possibility of a strong, capable Shi’a state on their border opened the possibility of an 
Iranian-allied state near the Eastern province.155 This was something that Saudi Arabia 
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finds unacceptable, and likely explains why they sat on their heels as Iraq descended 
into chaos. However, rather than weakening the Iranian hold over Iraq, the vacuum 
allowed Iran to step in and strengthen their position with the internationally recognized 
government. The increased cooperation between the U.S. and Iran in fighting a common 
enemy also alarmed the Saudi government, further entrenching them in the belief that 
the U.S. is not a reliable ally against the Iranians in the Middle East.  
The group’s rise, however, did constitute a major response on the Saudi border. 
With the Anbar province in the hands of ISIS after the fall of Ramadi in 2015, King 
Salman moved several brigades of Saudi troops to the north, and began building a 
border fence across the desert boundary.156 While this defensive posturing is 
understandable, it is remarkable to note that ISIS, a group that Saudi Arabia is at war 
with, could operate freely within the Anbar province a mere 100 miles away from 
where their troops were stationed. 
Iraqi refugees, facing similar situations as Syrians, poured out from both the 
Anbar province and other hard hit areas around the country. Many seek refuge in 
Europe, but few could receive any refuge in Saudi Arabia. This is compounded by a 
dearth of Saudi assistance to the Iraqi people. This represents, like Syria, a cynical use 
of power that seeks to accomplish the immediate goals of weakening Shi’a governments 
while ignoring their humanitarian consequences.157 While their actions fall in line with 
overall goals, the actions do not always justify the means, and represent the challenges 
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of the U.S. depending on allies to accomplish goals that they themselves are not willing 
to commit forces to.  
The chaos in Iraq and Syria, along with the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen, 
are a likely preview to the next few decades of Saudi foreign policy. Without the United 
States to directly interfere beyond narrow goals of “antiterrorism”, Prince Mohammed 
and King Salman will be free to pursue a realist foreign policy that seeks the 
containment of Iran and the degradation of its allies. The shift towards regional 
multipolarity will undercut the solutions to current conflicts, and spark future ones, as 
Iran and Saudi Arabia vie for regional influence.  
Israel 
King Salman and the Prince appear committed to peace and a cordial 
relationship with Israel. Like the Jordanians and the Egyptians, the Saudis recognize 
that it is ultimately in their best business and security interests to encourage a resolution 
of the Palestinian peace process to bring stability and trade. The ongoing occupation 
and siege of the Palestinian territories is a major recruiting tool for extremist 
organizations, and the lack of trade between Israel and its neighbors is a continuing lost 
business opportunity. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia offered formal peace to Israel in 
2002 as part of the Saudi peace plan. With the support of both the Arab league, and the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation, it became known as the Arab Peace Initiative 
(API), and it represented a historic attempt at having relations with Israel be normalized 
by all currently hostile countries.158 The plan was relatively straightforward, with peace 
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offered in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from occupied Golan Heights and 
Palestine, and a recognition of the legitimacy of a Palestinian state. This offer remains 
on the table, and will likely be pursued by King Salman and Prince Mohammed. In their 
eyes, few efforts could help bring greater stability to the Middle East than the 
achievement of Arab-Israeli peace. Furthermore, few things would bring the Kingdom 
more respect than the closing the over 70-year conflict. 
 An opening in the relationship between the two states and GCC at large is the 
Iran deal. Israel and Saudi Arabia have repeatedly chastised the Obama administration 
for not doing enough to deal with the security threats in the region, particularly with 
Iran.159 Israel and Saudi Arabia both condemned the Iran deal in private, arguing that it 
gave too much away to Iran in terms of material assistance and the removal of the 
Clinton sanctions. Both are wary that the Iranians will either continue building their 
nuclear weapons in secret, somehow out of the purview of the IAEA inspectors, or that 
the Iranians will simply use the influx of funding to promote their proxy and terrorist 
groups throughout the region. Billions of dollars of frozen funds and billions of dollars 
of new oil revenue will enrich the Iranian state, and while most of it will be used to 
bolster the country’s economy after years of harsh sanctions, some will undoubtedly 
make its way to the battlefield and fund groups that stand against Israel and Saudi 
Arabia.  
 The disengagement of the U.S. from the region due to the Obama 
administration’s reluctance to intervene in various conflicts created an opening for 
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pragmatic cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia.160 Israel and Saudi Arabia 
found common ground on intelligence sharing over common threats like the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Active and retired officials from both countries have met informally to 
discuss the groundwork of low-level cooperation. Expanding beyond traditional 
security, both countries are cooperating on research of desalinization, critically 
important for the future of both states as water becomes scarcer.161  
A potential détente between Saudi Arabia and Israel is ultimately in the U.S.’ 
interest, even if some of it arises due to their consternation with current applications of 
U.S. policy. Saudi Arabia’s influence over Arab states will likely nudge those states 
towards their own cooperation with Israel on issues of counter terror and anti-Iran 
policy. Israeli security, and reducing Arab sentiments that would jeopardize it, is one of 
the paths that are critical to creating the conditions necessary for the Israelis to pursue 
peace with the Palestinians through the API. Palestinian peace removes much of the 
impetuous for anti-Israeli sentiment, reducing the arguments in favor of radicalism, and 
instead replacing them with economic opportunities in trade with Israel.  
Security Diversification 
The Saudi government wants to maintain its positive and beneficial relationship 
with the United States. However, they also recognize that dependence on one power is 
not the safest long-term strategy. Anti-Saudi sentiment has rumbled in the United States 
since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and have reappeared in the recent JASATA bill. The rise 
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of populist anger in the United States, personified by the Donald Trump campaign for 
president, alarms Saudi Arabia and causes them to question the stability of American 
diplomatic relations across changing administrations. The perceived abandonment of 
Hosni Mubarak by the United States, who was a longtime ally under five different U.S. 
administrations, came as a shock for the Saudi monarchy, who were left to wonder what 
a future president would do if they were faced with a similar internal or external 
challenge to their existence.  
These concerns will drive the Saudis to diversify their security and diplomatic 
arrangements. Iran rapprochement and the U.S.’ expansion of their domestic energy 
production weaken the strength of the existing pillars of their alliance, and will cause 
the Saudis to increasingly seek deeper relations with other powers, notably China and 
India. The Saudis have maintained a positive relationship with the Chinese for decades, 
from buying ballistic missiles to selling a substantial amount of oil for China’s boom. 
162 In the mid-2000s, the Saudis signed a variety of agreements, from counterterror to 
energy, aiming to foster cooperation with the Indian government.163 In 2008, King 
Abdullah upgraded the Saudi-India bilateral relationship into a “strategic 
partnership”.164 The GCC also re-opened negotiations for a China-GCC free trade 
agreement, which would integrate the world’s largest market with one of the world’s 
wealthiest.165   
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However, China’s pragmatism in dealing with countries internationally will 
mean that it will not replace the United States as a similar guarantor of regional 
security. China’s unwillingness to get involved in disputes between independent 
countries will represent a limit to how far the relationship can go.166 In this, the Saudis 
will likely have to develop their own domestic capabilities if they want to maintain 
security over the long term, and this is reflected in their desire under Vision 2030 to 
drastically expand their domestic arms production. 
Resiliency 
The continuing drift between Saudi Arabia and the United States is not 
guaranteed. While there have been disagreements on a variety of problems, there are 
multitude of issues that will continue to engender cooperation between the two 
countries. They both want to degrade ISIS. They both want a two-state solution. They 
both want to see Iran contained. They both want to prevent proliferation in the region. 
The institutionalized framework of cooperation between the U.S. and Saudi militaries, 
built up over decades, will provide space for cooperation on these issues. While there 
are and will be disagreements over precise outcomes and methodologies, there will still 
be room for future U.S.-Saudi cooperation on security issues.  
Beyond security objectives, economic ties will provide a sticking point that will 
make full disengagement highly unlikely. There are hundreds of billions of dollars 
invested in each country through their respective public and private sectors. This will 
likely increase as state assets are sold off through Vision 2030. These investments do 
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not easily disappear, with legal and financial hurdles making it difficult to pull money 
out. Selling quickly and abruptly generally results in a loss, which would be avoided at 
all possibility. Absent some drastic market or political shift that would make long term 
returns untenable, private citizens will provide friction against efforts by their respective 
governments to devalue ties.  
Prominent in the United States will be the role that arms companies play in 
continuing pro-Saudi stances. With little domestic arms production, Saudi interventions 
in the short term require significant purchases of arms outside the country. This 
represents one of the most lucrative exports markets for a prominent U.S. industry. As 
Saudi Arabia demonstrates its willingness in the future to engage in a more active and 
aggressive foreign policy, it will continue to come back to U.S. companies for 
additional imports. These deals will maintain ties between the two states even as shale 
production displaces traditional American oil imports.  
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The Future of OPEC 
This will likely have important ramifications for OPEC, which will likely 
become obsolete if Vision 2030 comes to fruition. The cartel already changed directions 
in its manipulation of the oil market, from keeping prices artificially high to keeping 
them artificially low to keep out new producers like American fracking and the Alberta 
tar sands.167 Saudi oil, cheaper to produce than that of many of its competitors, was well 
suited to trade gross revenue for increased market share.168 This role reversal should 
signal the beginning of the end of the cartel, because the high price policy has 
diminishing value of return for higher price producing states. This means that OPEC is 
transforming into something simply being used for the Saudi’s short term gain. Saudi 
Arabia produce 30% of OPEC’s current output, and their sway to keep the cartel in 
overproduction is damaging the state coffers of Nigeria, Angola, and others.169  
The long-term plan looks far more muddled, because if the Prince’s strategy 
comes to fruition, then Saudi Arabia would not be beholden to oil as the main driver of 
their economy. A key goal for Prince Mohammed is to put Saudi Arabia in a position 
where oil prices, low or high, do not matter.170 Vision 2030 is designed to develop a 
diversified economy where market manipulation in unnecessary. This then raises an 
important question: if Saudi Arabia intends to give itself up to sway of the market, then 
why would they need to maintain an oil cartel? High prices will bring in more revenue 
for the state, allowing him to fund his economic transition and further endow the Saudi 
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sovereign fund. Low prices, once and still somewhat the bane of the state’s existence, 
would be okay in the future, because base revenue would still come in as Saudi market 
share expands to fill the loss of production by more expensive producers. This revenue, 
while less, would be enough under vision 2030 to meet the needs of a diversified state.  
The expansion of Saudi refining capabilities will only reinforce this. Increased 
Saudi refining will allow it to better meet its current demands, as it currently imports a 
quarter of its refined oil needs from others.171 The expansion of refining gives Saudi 
companies the ability to utilize oil for a more diversified industrial base, eating up oil 
that would otherwise go to the world market. A predicted impact of the diversification 
of the Saudi economy will be its removal as a “swing producer” of oil, reducing its 
influence in the world market, and its influence over U.S. middle eastern policy.172  
With the largest and most influential member of the cartel forgoing the need to 
manipulate the oil market, it likely means long term irrelevancy for OPEC. The 
expansion of cheap shale gas in the United States and the production from vast Saudi 
reserves would give the world two market-based producers that would checkback any 
reduction in OPEC production. This simultaneously diminishes the value of production 
quotas and overproducing, because drastic cutbacks would result in a Saudi-America fill 
in, and overproducing would be economically unfeasible for OPEC’s more expensive 
producers. This leaves the function of the cartel only for coordination of subtle price 
manipulations, which diminishes the efficacy of the organization.  
                                                      
171 Krane, Jim. "A Refined Approach: Saudi Arabia Moves beyond Crude." Energy Policy 82 (2015): 99-
104.   
172 Ibid 
 
 
66 
 
The short-term low oil prices pushed by Saudi Arabia will likely not be 
damaging to long-term U.S. interests, and will most likely be beneficial. While short 
term employment suffered due to a reduction in rig counts, the increased production per 
rig and the forces of competition have simply made U.S. rigs more efficient.173 
Considering the boom-time feel of the initial fracking rush, this feels more like a market 
correction, and has now made American shale more competitive than anticipated. This 
will make American producers robust and on par with international competitors, which 
will spare American producers from losses due to artificially low prices. Compounding 
this is the investment discrepancy required between traditional oil projects and U.S. 
shale producers. Oil that is located deep below the ground or in cost-intensive locations 
require significant long term planning and investment to complete, tying that project’s 
viability to a set oil price.174 Shale production, on the other hand, is much more flexible, 
and can respond much more rapidly to world prices with either increases or decreases in 
production.175 By simply following market signals, this will lend greater stability to 
world oil prices, diminishing the value of other states maintaining policies of market 
manipulation. 
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Limitations 
This paper takes for granted the stability of the Saudi state through the 
conceivable future. However, this is not guaranteed. There are multiple issues that could 
derail not only King Salman and Prince Mohammed’s plans, but the structure of the 
Saudi state itself. The modern Saudi state is less than one hundred years old, and was 
born out of the shrewd (but potentially short-sighted) methods of marriage ties by Ibn 
Saud. While this united the disparate tribes of the Arabian Peninsula, it does, multiple 
generations later, leave thousands of individuals with some sort of blood tie to the 
monarchy, giving them varying levels of real (and perceived) influence that will be 
harder and harder to balance as time goes on.  
In addition to balancing the delicate web of Saudi royal influence, the modern 
Saudi state is vulnerable to popular unrest in the Shi’a Eastern province. Although the 
state has successfully suppressed Shi’a movements there for over four decades, history 
demonstrates that these areas are liable to abrupt conflagration. Major movements both 
peaceful and armed would bring harmful economic instability in addition to damaging 
Saudi reputation as they are attempting to brand themselves as a secure investment hub. 
Although smaller in population, similar issues could pop up from unrest by Shi’as in the 
Southwest of the country along Yemen’s border.  
Beyond sectarian divisions, the state could also face popular unrest if Saudis 
grow unsatisfied with the state’s ability to provide economic opportunity. Autocratic 
governments like China’s have demonstrated a model where citizens are comfortable 
sacrificing political rights if they are advancing economically. If the burgeoning youth 
population is unable to find quality jobs, they will increasingly demand greater political 
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participation, putting the monarchy at a crossroads. It could either cede control, like the 
United Kingdom, and risk gradually withering into a powerless ceremonial role. Or they 
could tightly hold on and give dissatisfied citizens nothing, like Syria, risking civil 
unrest and a transition to rule through fear. This calculous went into the former King 
Abdullah’s decision to shower the Saudi citizenry with hundreds of billions of dollars in 
government assistance during the Arab spring, but such placating tactics are limited and 
cannot exist in perpetuity, lest they bankrupt the state and create their own economic 
chaos.  
None of the predictions made in this thesis are certain. Everything is subject to 
changes that make accurate forecasting extremely difficult. Events and issues that 
profoundly shape the world often are sudden and outside of the prognostications of even 
the best experts. Few, if any, would have walked through the streets of Cairo in 
December 2010 and proclaimed that the thirty-year dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak 
would come crashing down a month later. And, owning to the incredible 
interconnectedness of the world economy, there are too many moving variables to keep 
track of. Banking deficiencies of the mortgage market in the mid aughts caused the first 
worldwide economic slowdown since WWII, touching nearly every country on the 
globe in one way or another. These events, deemed “black swans” by author Nassim 
Taleb, will fundamentally change the future in unknowable ways, and are a severe 
limitation to the predictive power of this thesis.176  
 
                                                      
176 Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: Random 
House, 2007.  
 
 
69 
 
Lessons 
The breakdown in cooperation and shared policy goals in the U.S.-Saudi 
partnership represents the shortcomings of allying with states based on narrow realism. 
The economic drivers holding the relationship together were tenuously based on not 
only a single resource, but the important positioning of Saudi Arabia in that resource’s 
market. Once that began to slip away, the benefits in trying to support an increasingly 
more capable and strong Saudi state diminished. The lack of diversified commercial 
activities makes it easy for the new monarchy to pursue a policy that plans for a Saudi 
state that is no longer U.S. dependent. The massive social and political gaps make it 
easy for U.S. politicians to criticize the state and score political points with their 
constituents. The breakdown of yet another cold-war era alliance demonstrates the 
inherent drawbacks in depending on narrow, realist goals in establishing partnerships. 
They are often not long lasting, and are liable to rapid changes due to unpredictable 
developments.  
Furthermore, the problems that the Saudi state are causing, and will cause in the 
future, represent the pitfalls of a military focus in creating alliances and developing 
partners. The United States was not particularly interested in either the political or 
economic development of the Saudi state, instead choosing to focus on exchanging 
military assurances and hardware for oil and market stability. The result of this leaves 
Saudi Arabia with one of the most advanced militaries in the world, and an increasing 
willingness to use it in several fashions against Iran and its proxies. As the U.S. loses 
direct influence over the Saudi court, they will watch their arsenal be used in manners 
that run contrary to their wishes. Flooding allied states with weapons might be lucrative 
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and stabilizing in the short run, but can create massive unintended consequences if 
situations shift and the cooperation ends.  
The evolution of Saudi Arabia past a compliant, U.S. armed ally, should 
highlight the short-thinking of relying on weapons deals to achieve geopolitical goals. 
The weapons the U.S. sells countries are not chips for political favors, but massively 
destructive pieces of equipment that have incredible consequences. When selling 
massive amounts of weapons to states, more thorough questions must be asked. The 
durability of the partnership in question, the possibility of who these weapons might be 
used on, and under what circumstances, need to have adequate answers. If there is 
uncertainty, the U.S. should be more willing to reach for methods of economic 
assistance and partnership, as these methods traditionally have far less blowback 
potential. While less flashy than announcing a new arms deal, economic partnership 
better hedges against changes that would diminish the value of partners in the future.    
These shifts should also reinforce the thought that fundamentally undemocratic 
governments do not make the best long allies. With complete control of the 
government, autocrats can abruptly shift policies and act against U.S. interests, while 
utilizing the capabilities and weapons the U.S. provided through their support. Panama 
and Iraq are prominent examples of countries whose dictators received U.S. support, but 
were later deposed by their former ally for engaging in unacceptable policies. Worse 
yet, they are sometimes deposed in popular fashion and are replaced with vociferous 
anti-U.S. critics like Cuba and Iran. Years of pent up frustration against the patron 
government of their oppressors can explode into government sanctioned U.S. hatred. 
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This is not necessarily out of the question in Saudi Arabia if Vision 2030 does not go as 
planned or homegrown rebellion sparks to demand greater representation.  
The U.S., with all its tremendous power, has an incredible capacity to shape the 
world through its support of other foreign governments. What is decided in Washington 
extends far beyond the Potomac, often effecting people in every corner of the globe. 
Tremendously unethical U.S. policies, like supporting world autocrats in the name of 
narrow realist goals, contributes to systemic state-based violence in those countries in 
addition to severely contradicting the principals the U.S. was founded on. Much of this 
occurs because the public support and activism around changing these policies is little 
to non-existent, and is often broken up among disparate academics. Their criticism and 
actions are a mere pittance compared to the multi-billion dollar weapons and aid 
industry. However, that does not mean the criticism and self-reflection of U.S. policy 
should be abandoned, but instead redoubled, given the profound impact that it has on 
the lives of ordinary people all around the globe. Taxpayers ought to hold the Federal 
government to account over how and where their money is used to support 
undemocratic governments. The stakes are too high, and the impacts to wide-reaching, 
for Americans to tune out and be resigned to the status-quo.  
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Conclusion  
The United States and Saudi Arabia maintained a remarkable alliance for almost 
a century, built on the shared goals of regional and oil stability. Despite a significant 
divide in concepts of governmental and cultural norms, the convergence of interests 
allowed for a flourishing partnership. A variety of challenges throughout the 20th 
century brought the relationship closer, from the dramatic post World War II 
transformations, to the rise of an antagonistic Iran, to the looming specter of 
international terrorism. Their militaries cooperated closely, and oil flowed freely, 
cementing Saudi Arabia’s position as the bedrock of American Middle Eastern policy. 
However, the turbulence of the early 21st century, coupled with fundamental 
changes within both Saudi Arabia and the United States, created rifts between the two 
states. Shi’a proxy groups and states that Iran supports are challenged at every step by a 
Saudi monarchy that views the future of the Middle East in a black and white, cold-war 
mentality that refuses to cede any ground to their regional rival. The United States, 
which sees a more nuanced picture of the region, increasingly finds itself at odds with 
the Sunni zealotry that Saudi Arabia fosters.  
Compounding this is two long term American trends which decrease their 
reliance on Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East in general. The dramatic expansion of the 
United States as an energy kingpin through the development of hydraulic fracturing 
decreases their need for oil as a vital, strategic American interest. The desire for both 
the United States and Saudi Arabia to emerge as market followers of oil prices will 
reduce oil volatility, and eliminate the specter of OPEC’s influence over oil prices. The 
rise of East Asia displaces some of the economic clout of Middle Eastern economies, 
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fostering the American “pivot to Asia”. And the hesitance of American interventionism 
after a catastrophic Iraq war blunder encourages states to increasingly act on their own, 
without the prospect of guaranteed American backing. 
These trends occurred during the twilight years of the reign of King Abdullah, 
and his anti-Iranian policies were present long before the current monarchy that rules 
the country. But the current monarch, King Salman, has accelerated Saudi policies of 
self-interest and independence. To ensure that these policies are enshrined, King 
Salman put a significant amount of power into his young son, who stands to modernize 
the country and bring it closer to being able to operate as a strong, capable state free 
from the dependence on foreign powers that marked its development throughout the last 
century. By developing a post-oil economy in Vision 2030, and asserting Saudi interests 
in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and increasingly Israel, the Saudi state is seeking to move into 
the rest of the 21st century, likely behind future King Mohammed, as a state willing to 
maintain its strength and influence throughout the region.   
This policy is not without its challenges, and the meteoric rise of Prince 
Mohammed may be too much too fast. However, if these policies succeed, then Saudi 
Arabia will pursue a policy that breaks with their traditional U.S. dependence, enabling 
them to fully and independently pursue their own economic and security interests. This 
means that the U.S. will lose a compliant security partner and the traditional “swing 
producer” of oil that they depended on to manipulate the oil market at their urging. 
While this will free up the U.S. to pursue a geopolitical rebalancing to the rising East 
Asia region, it will also result in a diminished American capacity to directly influence 
events in the Middle East, as multipolarity replaces decades-long U.S. hegemony.  
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The U.S. will still need to be wary of the growing aggressiveness of the Saudi 
state. While this at times could mean the resolution of Arab problems by Arab means, it 
does mean that the U.S. will be in less of a position to control the outcomes of the 
actions that a more independent and bold Saudi state takes. Interests will not always 
perfectly align, and “in areas in which Saudi national security or strategic interests are 
at stake, the Kingdom will pursue its own agenda.”177 Although this frees up the U.S. 
from previous Middle Eastern responsibilities, they will face some of the unintended 
consequences from Saudi adventurism under King Salman and Prince Mohammed. 
 
 
                                                      
177 Ulrichson, Kristian Coates. "The Gulf States and the Rebalancing of Regional and 
Global Power." James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University (2014).  
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